In the lab, we examine the effectiveness of two land use conservation policies: a tradable set aside requirements (TSARs), and the TSARs combined with an agglomeration bonus. Evaluated by bioeconomic efficiency, our experimental results suggest: 1) TSARs is a cost-effective land conservation tool; and 2) combining TSARS with the agglomeration bonus increases habitat connectivity but at a price-lower economic efficiency. * Thanks to the USDA, and the UW Stroock and Bugas funds for partial financial support. Shogren thanks the Norwegian University of Life Sciences for their support while working on this project. Additional thanks to Travis Warziniack and students at the University of Wyoming for insightful comments and discussions.
Introduction
Protecting biological diversity and ecosystem services remains a key element of 21 st Century government regulation (see e.g., Barbier, 2011) . Numerous government programs around the globe have been implemented to control or influence public and private land uses (Langpap and Wu, 2004; Crepin, 2005; Feng et al., 2006; Clement and Amezaga, 2009; Henger and Bizer, 2010; Bullock and King, 2011) . In the United States, for instance, federal policies such as the National Environmental Policy Act, Farm Bills, the Endangered Species Act, and the Clean Water Act all place regulatory requirements on land use practices. The regulations imposed by these policies extend across both private and public lands as do the majority of the resources these federal policies are designed to protect. Not surprisingly, the political opposition against implementation of these policies differs, however, depending on whether the policy affects private and public lands-private landowners complain loudly when public policy restricts their land use decisions (see, e.g., Smith and Shogren, 2002) .
While the costs of meeting regulatory constraints on public lands are incurred by society, private landowners pick up the tab to protect biodiversity and ecosystem services on private lands. These private landowners have incentive to avoid the costs of land use regulations; for example, they can alter land attributes to have less conservation value prior to the imposition of regulatory constraints (Innes et al., 1998) . This can result in less conservation at greater cost to achieve regulatory goals (see Ando et al, 1998; Dreschler and Watzold, 2001; Hartig and Drechsler, 2009; Hamaide and Sheerin, 2010) .
Economists and practitioners have long argued that positive incentives are needed to induce landowners to cooperate with regulatory protection of ecosystem services (Bean, 1998; Shogren et al., 1999; Adler, 2008) . Positive incentives take on many forms (e.g., taxes, subsidies; see Parkhurst and Shogren, 2003; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002) .
Tradable development rights (TDR) is a key incentive system proposed for efficiency properties (Innes et al., 1998; Thornes and Simons, 1998; Boyd et al., 2000) . For a TDR policy, a regulator sets the maximum amount of allowed development, allocates TDRs to landowners, and then allows a market to exist so buyers and sellers can reallocate TDRs such that the property with the lowest opportunity cost remains undeveloped.
One of the initial tradable development scheme was implemented in New York
City and allowed for neighboring landowners to trade building density (Renard, 2007) .
Adjoining landowners can combine their allowed floor area while maintaining separate property ownership, provided the aggregate floor area for both buildings does not exceed the zoned maximum amount of floor area of the two properties. A developer can increase the buildings allowed density by purchasing the unused floor area of an adjacent landowner.
The TDR program can work for economic efficiency by transferring development rights from low value areas to high value areas; but has two primary weaknesses when we consider biological efficiency: 1) low land development values are imperfectly correlated with high conservation values. The land conserved will be the lowest development valued land but it might not be the land desired for the valuable ecosystem services; and 2) conserved parcels may not be located spatially to create the contiguous habitat and land corridors that create positive biological network externalities.
Networking conserved parcels may reduce the cost of conservation as fewer parcels are needed to meet the regulatory objective (Ando et al., 1998; Parkhurst and Shogren, 2008) . To overcome these shortcomings, a regulator should design the TDR incentive mechanism to have two components: one focused on retiring land, and a second that creates the desired spatial configuration.
Two mechanisms have been proposed that combine TDRs and a spatial component. First, Mills (1980) proposed combining a TDR policy with zoning to deal with the imperfect spatial correlation between development values and conservation values. A government regulator first determines the area desired for conservation (the -sending zone‖), severs the right to develop, and then allocates TDR to the landowners within the sending zone. TDRs are sold through a market instrument. 1 The problem with Mills' mechanism is it negates the least cost aspect of a TDR policy. Instead the method relegates TDRs to be just a compensatory tool in a landscape in which the regulator chooses winners and losers. In addition, implementing a TDR with zoning mechanism is expensive for local jurisdictions which may prove cost prohibitive given economic circumstances (see Henger and Bizer, 2010) .
Second, Drechsler and Watzold (2009) introduced an algorithm for a TDR program that incorporates the spatial component within the biodiversity measurement mechanism. The mechanism accounts for the biodiversity network externalities created through the location of conserved land within the landscape and determine the amount of 1 The most illustrative application of a TDR scheme is the Pinelands National Preserve in New Jersey which was established in 1978 to protect the environment. In 1980 a comprehensive management plan was approved. The plan delineated the 4,000 square kilometers of densely populated forested expanse into 10 categories with differing zoning ordinances. Some categories were designated as areas where development was not permitted but able to transfer development rights, while other categories allowed for varying degrees of development in conjunction with the purchase of a development right. Herein we propose a third incentive mechanism to combine tradable permits and spatial incentives. We create a system that combines a tradable set-aside requirement (TSARs) with an agglomeration bonus to meet spatial conservation objectives at least cost (see Parkhurst and Crocker, 2002; . A regulator determines the number of land parcels necessary to meet spatial conservation objectives and then allocates set-aside requirements proportionally to the landowners. Each set aside obligates the possessing landowner to conserve one parcel of land. The regulator creates a market that facilitates trade that moves conservation to the low cost parcels. To induce the desired configuration the regulator pays the landowners an agglomeration bonus for each border shared between two conserved parcels .
The agglomeration bonus induces the landowners to coordinate their conserved parcels into contiguous habitat reserves. The agglomeration bonus can be structured to satisfy numerous spatial configurations (see Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007; 2008) .
We design a lab experiment to testbed the two-part TSARs with agglomeration bonus mechanism; we compare our two-part mechanism to a TSARs-only policy and a benchmark command and control approach that forces each landowner to conserve an equal amount of land. Comparing the results over economic and biological measures of efficiency, we find that TSARs is a cost-effective land conservation tool. Additionally, combining TSARS with the agglomeration bonus increases biological efficiency (habitat connectivity) but at a price-lower economic efficiency.
Experimental Design
Our experimental design had six structural elements-1) treatments; 2) players, positioning, and the land grid; 3) subsidies, strategies, and calculator; 4) tradable setaside requirements (TSARs) market and predictions; 5) communication, information and history, and 6) procedures. Consider each in turn.
Treatments. Three institutional structures were tested-no trade (NT), trade only (TO), and trade with an agglomeration bonus (TAB). In the NT treatment, each person was allocated 5 conservation set-aside requirements. People were forced to conserve one parcel of land to satisfy each conservation set-aside requirement. Similarly, in the TO treatment each landowner was allocated 5 set-aside requirements for which one cell must be conserved to satisfy the regulatory constraint. A market was now constructed in which people could trade their set-aside requirements. In this treatment, TSARs are seen as a liability-a landowner must forego productivity on one parcel of land to satisfy the TSAR, and as such requires the recipient of the TSAR to be compensated.
The TAB treatment was identical to the TO treatment except that people now could receive an additional payment-the agglomeration bonus-for each border shared between two of their own conserved parcels. This agglomeration bonus has three impacts:(i) it creates a network externality between own conserved parcels; (ii) by setting the agglomeration bonus to exceed the opportunity cost of conservation the agglomeration bonus changes participants perception of TSARs. TSARs are now seen as an asset as opposed to a liability; (iii) because TSARs with the agglomeration bonus is seen as an asset, participants will voluntary engage in the conservation program. We conducted two sessions of each institutional structure. Each session had 20 rounds.
Number of participants, positioning, and land grid. Participants. Eight subjects participated in each session. They were told they would be randomly assigned to a group of four subjects. The group of four participants and each participant's placement within the land grid would remain fixed for the remainder of the experiment. Positioning. We chose fixed groupings and fixed placements to provide participants consistency and they can apply past experience to present actions. Grid. In Figure 1 were common knowledge and participants had a specification page that delineated grid holdings and showed the land values for the entire 10x10 grid.
Subsidies, Strategies, and Calculator. In the NT and TO treatments no subsidies existed-the costs of conservation were levied on the participants. In the TAB treatment, participants earned an additional $50 payment for each border shared between two of their own retired cells-shifting the costs of conservation from the participant to the experiment monitor (proxy regulator). Strategies. Participants were instructed that they could leave their cells green, in which case they earned the value in the cell, or they could brown out cells, which mean they earn the applicable subsidies but forego the value of the cell. Each subject was required (allowed for the TAB treatment) to -brown out‖ 5
cells. Note the large set of potential strategy set. By presenting participants with the land grid and requiring participation the participants have 53,130 potential strategies. were provided with an auction window that facilitated trade in brown out cell requirements (or TSARs). They were informed they could be buyers or sellers and were allowed to submit both bids and asks. Further, they were informed that prices could be positive, negative, or zero and the implications of positive and negative prices were discussed. Participants were told all prices must be in whole integers and that they would have 7 minutes to make trades. The auction window allowed them to make bids or asks for individual units or for multiple units-a separate bid (ask) could be made for each quantity of TSARs up to the maximum individual holdings. This feature was important in the TAB treatment in which the agglomeration bonus created a sticky market when only single unit trading was allowed (purchase of the TSAR increases the bidders shared borders by one but diminishes the sellers shared borders by two). price is [$10, 11, 12,…, 56, 57, 58] .
3 The range of market prices is determined as the average price per TSAR for the seller on the lower bound and the average price per TSAR for the buyer on the upper bound.
Communication, Information, and History. Communication. Participants were also provided the opportunity to communicate one message per round. Communication was non-binding, unstructured with no restrictions on timing or content, and in which a common language was implemented by allowing subjects to send messages in their natural language (Crawford, 1998) . Participants had seven minutes to send messages, make trades and use the calculator, and send their choices. 4 Information. After all four participant's choices were submitted the resulting grid was presented to the group. They had common knowledge regarding payoffs and strategies. History. The entire 10x10
grid showing the configuration of brown cells and the payoffs for each subject within the group then appeared in the history box. They were also provided with record sheets to further help them keep track of their own and the other group members' choice of strategies and associated payoffs in previous rounds.
Procedures. All experiments were on computers. Participants were not told the objective of the experiment and all wording in the instructions and on the computer screens were context free. Following standard protocol, the participants were recruited campus wide and were told to report at a computer lab at a given time. Experimental instructions were provided to each participants and the monitor read them out loud. See
Appendix A for the exact instructions. Participants were given an opportunity to ask questions concerning the experimental procedures, which were answered by the monitor.
The monitor also walked the participants through two practice rounds to familiarize them with the experimental design. The monitor handed out the agglomeration bonus specification page, which participants were allowed to review. The participants then entered their name and student identification number into the computer, and the computer randomly assigned them to groups of four.
Results
We examine the experimental results in two steps-1) we present an illustrative example for one group from each of the three treatments; and 2) we discuss the group outcomes based on several measures of bioeconomic efficiency: biological efficiency, economical efficiency, cost efficiency, and spatial efficiency. Consider each in turn. strategies in every round. Also, as the experiment progresses, the position 2 participant is able to increase his inventory of TSARs through trade. In rounds 18 and 19 the group is able to achieve the group outcome that results in the greatest economic returns for the group. However, because TSARs, alone, does not create incentives to link conserved parcels, maximum payoffs do not imply maximum connectivity. Rather, for TSARs, maximum payoffs imply the minimum productive land is conserved.
Illustrative Example
Finally, turning to group outcomes for TAB in Figure 3 , we see the participant in 
Bioeconomic Efficiency
To better understand how our results relate to conservation targets, we evaluate the success of the compensation mechanisms by cost efficiency, economic efficiency, biological efficiency, and spatial efficiency. Cost efficiency (CE) is the ratio of actual foregone productivity to the minimum foregone productivity: CE = Group foregone productivity/540. Economic efficiency (EE) is the percentage of available program rents earned by the group: EE = (Group earnings -min earnings)/(max earnings -min earnings). 5 Biological efficiency (BE) is a gradient measure-the percentage of the shared borders between conserved parcels achieved by the group to the maximum number of shared borders. 6 Finally, spatial efficiency (SE) is the percentage of predicted cells that are actually conserved.
We use a Spearman's Rho rank correlation test to establish the independent set of observations within group. The Spearman Rho uses the combination of round and outcome to determine correlation (or lack thereof) across rounds (see Conover, 1999 
Concluding comment
The success of tradable pollution permit programs at meeting air quality standards for regional air pollutants at minimum cost has encourage policy makers and academics to find ways of creating marketable instruments that can be readily applied to land uses (see e.g., Stavins, 1998) . Limits do exist, however, in transferring the idea of the standard tradable air pollution permit policy to control land uses. Marketable instruments need to address explicitly two challenges: spatial heterogeneity in habitat quality and the poor correlation between land valued low for development but high for conservation.
Herein we examined two institutions that address these challenges-tradable setaside requirements (TSARs), and TSARs combined with an agglomeration bonus, relative to the benchmark case of command and control. Compared across cost efficiency, biological efficiency, economic efficiency, and spatial efficiency, the results suggest TSARs can work given asymmetric landowners, habitat quality connectivity, high correlation between low cost land, and an opportunity set for conservation that includes millions of possible combinations of 20 conserved parcels. Combining TSARs with an agglomeration bonus improves habitat connectivity but at a greater cost. 
